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RULE 15a-6 AND BEYOND: ARE U.S. RULES FOR NONU.S. BROKER-DEALERS WORKABLE IN TODAY'S
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE?
Aaron C. Ballt
Thomas R. Rustt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Effective August 15, 1989, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") adopted Rule 15a-6. 1 This rule provides
for conditional exemptions from broker-dealer registration under
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 for foreign entities engaged in
certain limited securities activities in the United States. 3 In the 1988
proposing release,4 the Commission recognized that the "world's securities markets rapidly [were] becoming international in scope."5
Examples included the relatively common occurrence of multinational offerings, and the increased trend toward foreign and domestic broker-dealers establishing international offices, and the development of linkages between trading markets. The Commission cited
this internationalization of the securities industry as th~ basis for
adopting Rule 15a-6. 6
However, more than a decade later, with the advent of the
Euro, the introduction of Electronic Communications Networks

t
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1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

B.A., 1994, Loyola College; J.D., 1997, University of Baltimore School of Law;
Member, Maryland State Bar Association, American Bar Association; Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer, AmSouth Bank and AmSouth Investment Servs., Inc.; Professional Certifications: Series 5, 7, 24, 63.
B.A., 1981, Fordham University; J.D., 1986, Columbia University; Member, New
York State Bar Association and Maryland State Bar Association; Vice President
and Counsel, Allfirst Bank.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (1999).
15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd (1997).
See Internationalization of the Securities Markets, Report of the Staff of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, at V - 41 to V - 49 (July 27, 1987) ("Report on Internationalization").
See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988).
[d. at 23,648.
See id.
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("ECNs"), the impact of technology and the Internet, the recent
trends in financial reform, and a continuing shift towards industry
consolidation through international mergers and acquisitions, the
securities industry must reevaluate Rule 15a-6. 7 This Article examines whether Rule 15a-6 has outlived its usefulness in light of the
objectives of U.S. securities laws and regulations - to establish and
promote markets that are fair and efficient (and are perceived as
such by participants) and the fact that in a post-Cold War world, national boundaries have seemingly become secondary to market imperatives. To that end, Part II reviews the historical background
leading to the adoption of Rule 15a-6. 8 Part III discusses the adopting release for the Rule. 9 Part IV evaluates the exemptions from registration for the foreign broker.lo Finally, Part V presents and analyzes comments received by the CommissionY
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO ADOPTION OF
RULE 15a-6
The internationalization of financial markets has been an area
of considerable debate, review and revision during the past few decades. 12 The Commission has often been prompted to revisit and expand its position on foreign broker-dealer activity by a U.S. securities industry anxious to compete on a global scale.13
In 1964, the Presidential Task Force on Promoting Increased
Foreign Investment in United States Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for United States Corporations Operating Abroad ("Task Force") urged the Commission to clarifY its position on foreign affairs. 14 In June of 1988, the Task Force
recommended that the Commission publish a release setting forth
its position on the registration, under the Securities Act of 1933,15
of offerings made by U.S. issuers outside the United States. 16 In ad7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See Repon on Internationalization, supra note 3, at 11-88 to 11-90.

See infra notes 12-53 and accompanying text. .
See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-92 and accompanying text.
See Lisa K. Bostwick, The SEC Response to International and Institutionalization:
Ruk 144A Merit Regulation of InvestfffS, 23 lAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 423 (1996).
See, e.g., Tensions High as Exchanges, ECNs Face Change, SEC INDUS. NEWS, May
15, 2000, availabk in 2000 WL 4049812.
See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988).
See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994).
See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
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dition, the Task Force suggested a release be published on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's ("Exchange Act")17 registration for
foreign underwriters participating in distributions of U.S. issuers' securities exclusively to nonresidents of the United States. IS In June of
1988, the Commission initially responded with the Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers Exchange Act Release No.
25,80V9
Further, the Commission published Securities Act Release No.
4708 ("Release 4708"),20 which identified the conditions under
which a foreign underwriter of a U.S. issuer's foreign offering of securities would not be required to register as a broker-dealer under
Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act. 21 The Commission indicated
that registration was not required if a foreign broker-dealer limited
its participation in a foreign offering of U.S. securities or the foreign part of a multinational offering of such securities to: (1) selling securities outside the United States to non-U.S. persons; and (2)
participating in an underwriting syndicate in which all U.S. activities, such as sales to selling group members, stabilization, overallotment, and group sales, were carried out for the syndicate exclusively by a managing underwriter or underwriters registered with
the Commission. 22 Nevertheless, registration would be required
where a foreign broker-dealer sold securities in the United States or
purchased securities in the United States for sale to U.S. investors
abroad. 23
Until Rule 15a-6, however, the Commission had traditionally insisted upon broker-dealer registration of foreign firms dealing with
U.S. investors. 24 In 1967, the Commission indicated that:

17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

lease No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988).
See supra note 2.
See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988).
See id.
See Interpretive Releases Relating to the Securities Act of 1933 and General
Rules and Regulations Thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 231 (1999). This release was
denominated also as Securities Exchange Act release 7366. It addressed both
the need for registration under the Securities Act for securities sold abroad,
and registration under the Exchange Act for foreign broker-dealers participating in a foreign offering of securities of U.S. issuers. See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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[W]hile we sometimes raise no objection if a broker-dealer,
without registration, buys securities in the United States and
sells them outside the jurisdiction of the United States to
persons other than United States nationals[,J25 we would
not be willing to take such a no-action position as to broker-dealer registration if a broker-dealer sells any securities,
even foreign securities, to United States nationals. 26
However, even prior to the Rule 15a-6 proposing release, the
Commission began to relax its position by granting a number of
"no-action requests to foreign broker-dealers" that wished to create
contacts with U.S. institutions, through the registered broker-dealer
affiliates. 27 These no-action positions imposed the responsibility for
many facets of U.S. persons' accounts upon the registered brokerdealer.28
The Commission further indicated that U.S. institutional investors receiving research from a foreign broker-dealer affiliate of a
U.S. bank holding company must be mediated by the U.S. investor. 29 Furthermore, if a U.S. institutional investor that obtained such
research contacts a foreign broker-dealer, a registered representative of the U.S. affiliate would be required to participate in all communications between the foreign broker-dealer and the U.S. inves25.

26.

27.
28.

29.

"The [Commission] also has taken no-action positions concerning the sale of
U.S. securities by foreign broker-dealers to foreign investors outside the
United States, where the securities were obtained in U.S. secondary markets
through a registered broker-dealer." [d. (citing letter from Francis R.
Snodgrass, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to M.
David Hyman, Director of Legal & Compliance Department, Bear, Steams &
Co. Gan. 7, 1976».
[d. (citing letter from Robert Block, Chief Counsel, Division of Trading and
Markets, SEC, to Roberto Luna (Feb. 21, 1967». Moreover, Section 30(b) of
the Exchange Act limits the Commission's jurisdictional reach only "insofar as
[a person] transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the
United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
to prevent the evasion of [Title 15]." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1994).
See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 25,801,53 Fed. Reg. 23,645, 23,647 (1988).
See Exchange Act Release, supra note 4. Other responsibilities include "taking
orders directly from the U.S. persons, holding the accounts, confirming the
trades, and maintaining all book and records on transactions for the U.S. persons." [d.
See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,647 (1988) (referring to a letter from Amy Natterson Kroll,
Attorney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Frank Puleo, Esq., Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy dated July 28, 1987).
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tor. 30 Should orders result from these conversations, the U.S.
broker-dealer would execute any orders and manage the accounts
of the U.S. institutional investors,31
The Commission also adopted temporary no-action positions in
which market maker quotations collected and published by a foreign exchange were distributed in the United States. 32 Although foreign market makers who give quotes displayed in the United States
could effect transactions in securities with regard to U.S. brokerdealer registration provisions,33 the Commission granted the request
for a temporary no-action position. 34 In doing so, the Commission
sought to promote access to information on foreign market conditions. 35 However, the Commission made clear that any actions by
market makers leading to substantial U.S. contacts, other than the
passive circulation of foreign market makers' quotes and consequential trades, were outside the realm of a no-action position. 36
The Commission opined that "[sJolicitation includes efforts to
induce a single transaction or to develop an ongoing securities business relationship. "37 Solicitation may be any affirmative effort by a
broker or a dealer intended to induce transactional business for the

30.
31.
32.

33.

34.

35.
36.
37.

See id.
See id.
See id. The Commission approved a six-month pilot program for the NASDI
ISE link. See id. at n.23 (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51
Fed. Reg. 15,989 (Apr. 21, 1986».
See id. (citing letter from Robert L.D. Colby, Deputy Chief Counsel, Division
of Market Regulation, SEC, to Richard B. Smith, Esq., Davis, Polk & Wardwell .
dated July 3, 1986).
See id. (citing letter from Mary Chamberlin, Chief Counsel, Division of Market
Regulation, SEC, to Frank J. Wilson, General Counsel, NASD dated May 7,
1986). "The [Commission] accorded a parallel temporary no-action position
to the ISE regarding the dissemination of SEAQ quotation information in the
United States through the ISE's own information vendor, TOPIC." [d. (citing
letter from Robert L.D. Colby, Chief Counsel, Division of Market Regulation,
SEC, to Richard B. Smith, Esq., Davis, Polk & Wardwell dated Nov. 28, 1986).
"Similarly, the [Commission] issued a no-action letter regarding a pilot program providing for an exchange of quotations between NASDAQ and the Singapore Stock Exchange." [d. (citing letter from Amy Natterson Kroll, Attorney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Frank J. Wilson, General Counsel,
NASD dated Dec. 11, 1987; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,457, 53
Fed. Reg. 9156 (1988».
See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,647 (1988).
See id.
[d. at 23,650.
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broker-dealer or its affiliates. 38 Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act
refers to both inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or
sale of securities. 39 The activities generally viewed as involving solicitation included: telephone calls from a broker-dealer to a customer
encouraging use of the broker-dealer to effect transactions; running
investment seminars for U.S. investors regardless of whether the
seminars are hosted by a registered U.S. broker-dealer; advertising
the activities of foreign broker-dealers and their willingness to trade
foreign securities in U.S. newspapers or periodicals of general circulation in United States or on any radio or television station whose
broadcasting is directed into the United States;40 publishing quotes
in the United States;41 and "providing advice about foreign securities (particularly where the advice is provided in return for brokerage commissions on transactions placed with the foreign brokerdealer). "42
In 1986, the Commission exempted a number of foreign broker-dealers from broker-dealer registration requirements, even
though they acted as dealers in the United States. 43 Citicorp, a U.S.
38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

See id. "[The] key to the issue of solicitation is whether the foreign brokerdealer's contacts with U.S. markets reasonably may be viewed as attempting to
induce an investor's purchase or sale of a security." [d. at n.54 (citing Report
on Internationalization, supra note 3, at V42; letter from David Romanski, Attorney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Hugh Seymour, Hoare &
Covett, Ltd. dated Sept. 28, 1973).
"Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act requires registration of brokers and dealers that effect transactions or 'induce or attempt to induce the purchase or
sale of, any security.'" [d. at n.53 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 780(a».
See id. at 23,646 (citing letter from David Romanski, Attorney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Hugh Seymour, Hoare & Covett, Ltd. dated Sept. 28,
1973).
See id. (citing letter from Michael Saperstein, Associate Director, Division of
Market Regulation, SEC, to Irving Marmer, Esq. dated Dec. 4, 1972). "[A] foreign entity distributing ... stock quotations to U.S. subscribers and receiving
buy and sell orders from the subscribers, to be executed on foreign securities
exchanges, was denied a no-action position." [d. at n.12.
[d. (citing letter from Eric Thompson, Attorney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Richard D. Haynes, Esq., Haynes and Boone dated Aug. 23,
1974).
[d. at 23,647 (citing letter from Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC, to Marcia
MacHarg, Esq., Debevoise & Plimpton (dated Aug. 13, 19, 1986) (Vickers da
Costa/Citicorp». "Section 15 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
780 (a) (2), authorizes the Commission to exempt any broker, dealer, or class
thereof, conditionally or unconditionally, from the broker-dealer registration
requirements, consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors." [d. at n.29.
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bank holding company, owned the foreign broker-dealers, and
sought to purchase a U.S. affiliate of the foreign broker-dealers
through its U.S. bank subsidiary, Citibank.44 In addition, the U.S. affiliate was an active market maker in NASDAQ and a registered U.S.
broker-dealer.45 Due to laws precluding Citibank from owning a
market maker,46 the U.S. affiliate's activities were restricted to executing those orders received from U.S. customers against those
standing orders provided by the foreign broker-dealers. 47
Subject to four conditions, the Commission permitted foreign
broker-dealers to purchase and sell shares at the same time through
the U.S. affiliate without registering as domestic broker-dealers. 48
First, the Commission limited the price and size of the foreign broker-dealers' outstanding orders. 49 Consequently, the U.S. affiliate
was able to exercise some discretion in its trading activities. 50 Second, as a safeguard against possible failure of the foreign-broker
dealers, the U.S. affiliate agreed to increase its net capital requirements to ensure its settlement obligations. 51 Third, Citicorp agreed
to cooperate with. Commission investigations by disclosing information to the Commission regarding the trading activities of the foreign broker-dealers. 52 Lastly, Citicorp agreed to serve as "the foreign
broker-dealers' agent for service of process in· any actions involving
the foreign broker-dealers. "53
44.

45.
46.

47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.

See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645, 23,647
(1988).
See id.
See id. ("Because the Glass-Steagall Act prevented Citibank from owning a
market maker, the foreign broker-dealers entered into a contractual agreement with the U.S. affiliate that called for the foreign broker-dealers to provide standing orders to buy and sell the securities in which the U.S. affiliate
had previously acted as a market maker.").
See id. at 23,648. "This arrangement was approved by the Comptroller of the
Currency." Id. at n.32 (citing letter from Judith A. Walter, Senior Deputy
Comptroller, to Ellis E. Bradford, Vice President, Citibank, N.A. dated Jun.
13, 1986).
See id. at 23,648.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. "Citicorp represented that information regarding the trading activities
of the foreign broker-dealers would be made available to the ~ommission in
connection with any investigation, and that it would attempt to obtain customer consent to release of information concerning their trading, if requested." Id.
Id.
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III. THE ADOPTING RELEASE FOR RULE 15a-6
In 1989, the Commission adopted Rule 15a-6 under section
15 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act. 54 Rule 15a-6 provides for conditional
exemptions from broker-dealer registration for foreign entities engaged in certain activities involving U.S. investors and securities
markets. 55 Unless otherwise exempted, section 15 (a) of the Exchange Act requires any broker-dealer that uses any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect transactions or to induce the purchase or sale of any security, to register as a brokerdealer.56 Sections 3(a) (4) and 3(a) (5) of the Exchange Act define
the terms "broker" and "dealer" to apply to "any person" without a
limiting requirement of U.S. citizenship.57 Accordingly, section 15(a)
"literally applies to foreign broker-dealers who use the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to offer or sell securities. "58
The reasons underlying the Commission's adoption of Rule
15a-6 were two-fold. First, the rule was intended "to facilitate access
to foreign markets by U.S. institutional investors through foreign
broker-dealers and the research that they provide, consistent with
maintaining the safeguards afforded by broker-dealer registration. "59
Second, the rule was intended "to provide clear guidance to foreign
broker-dealers seeking to operate in compliance with U.S. brokerdealer registration requirements."6O
By the time Rule 15a-6 was adopted, all broker-dealers effecting, inducing or attempting to induce any securities transactions in
the United States were required to register as broker-dealers with
the Commission. 61 However, domestic entities were not subject to
the same requirements if they conducted their activities entirely

54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

Exchange Act Release No. 27,017,54 Fed. Reg. 30,031 Uuly 18, 1989).
id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (1999).
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4),(5) (1995).
6 LoUiS Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGUlATION 3012 (3d ed. 1990); see
id. at n.1l7 ("Section 3(a) (17) defines 'interstate commerce' to mean 'trade,
transportation, or commerce . . . between any foreign country and any state
See
See
See
See

... "').
59.

Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act Release
No. 27,017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,013 (1989).

60.
61.

[d.
See 6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 58, at 3017-18. This Commission require-

ment has been called the "territorial" approach, and applied equally to activities directed to foreign investors outside the United States. See id. at 3018.
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outside the United States. 62
In addition, the Commission applied the registration requirements and regulatory system governing domestic brokers to those
foreign broker-dealer entities operating a branch in the United
States. 63 However, if the foreign broker-dealer established an affiliate
in the United States, only that affiliate was required to register as a
broker-dealer.64 As such, absent certain exemptions, only the registered U.S. affiliate would be permitted to trade with U.S. investors
or perform securities functions on behalf of those customers. 65 Such
functions include effecting trades, extending credit, maintaining
records and issuing confirmations, and receiving, delivering, and
safeguarding funds and securities. 66 The Commission, however, expressly stated that if an introducing-clearing relationship existed,
where the foreign broker-dealer held U.S. customers' funds and securities, registration of the foreign broker-dealer would be
required. 67
The territorial approach employed by the Commission generally required registration by foreign broker-dealers that, from
outside the United States, induced or attempted to induce trades by
persons in the United States. 68 The Commission indicated, however,
that it would not require foreign broker-dealers to register when
dealing from abroad with foreign persons domiciled abroad but
temporarily present in the United States. 69 Furthermore, the Commission did not require registration when a foreign broker-dealer
effected trades outside the United States for U.S. citizens residing
abroad, so long as the foreign broker-dealer had no other contacts
within the jurisdiction of the United States. 70
62.
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See id. This Commission requirement has been called the "entity" approach.
See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (b) (3) (1999).
&e 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 58, at 3018; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a6(a)(2)(iii) (1995). Similarly, only the affiliate's personnel must be licensed
appropriately by the NASD or another Self-Regulatory Organization ("SRO").
See § 3(a) (18) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(18) (1999).
See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,017 (1989).
See id.
See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,029.
See id. at 30,017.
See id.
See id. "The Commission historically has taken the view, however, that foreign
broker-dealers specifically targeting identifiable groups of U.S. persons residing abroad, e.g., U.S. military and embassy personnel, could be subject to U.S.
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The requirements of section 15(a) do not distinguish between
solicited and unsolicited transactions. 71 Nevertheless, the Commission indicated, that as a matter of policy, U.S. registration would
not be necessary if a c!omestic investor, on its own initiative, sought
out a foreign broker-dealer outside the United States and initiated
transactions in foreign securities markets.72 The Commission reasoned that U.S. investors initiating trades outside the United States
would not expect the foreign broker-dealer to be subject to U.S.
broker-dealer regulations. 73 The Commission also noted that foreign
broker-dealers would very likely refuse to deal with U.S. persons
under any circumstances if required to comply with U.S. registration requirements as a result of these unsolicited trades. 74
Numerous commentators argued for narrowing the definition
of "solicitation. "75 However, the Commission favors a broad construction of "solicitation," as the express language of section
15 (a) (1) refers to both inducing or attempting to induce the
purchase or sale of securities. 76
The Commission, however, has permitted certain activities perceived to be "solicitation" without the requirement of registration.
For example, the Commission continues to allow U.S. distribution
of foreign broker-dealers' quotations by third party systems without
requiring registration. 77 In addition, the Commission has indicated
that foreign broker-dealers would not have to register if the scope
of their U.S. activities were limited to contacts with registered braker-dealers and banks acting as broker-dealers. 78

71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

broker-dealer registration requirements." Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 30,018. Commentators such as Fidelity Investments, Madrid Stock Exchange, an'd Dechert, Price & Rhoads argued for the more narrow definition.
See id. at n.57.
See id. at 30,018.
See id.
See id. at 30,020. Banks acting as broker-dealers may include banks that act as
government or municipal securities dealers. See Registration Requirements for
Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,017, 43 SEC Docket
2445, 2477 Guly 18, 1989); see also National Westminster Bank PLC, SEC NoAction Letter, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,881
Guly 7, 1988); Security Pac. Corp., 1988-1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,883
Guly 7, 1988).
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Rule 15a-6 codified and broadened these exemptions. Under
section 15 (a) (2) of the Rule, the Commission established four exemptions that permit foreign broker-dealers to engage in certain activities without U.S. registration. 79 Under the Rule, a foreign brokerdealer may rely on different exemptions for different transactions. 80

N. EXEMPTIONS FOR REGISTRATION UNDER RULE 15a-6
Rule 15a-6, in effect, establishes exemptions for various brokerdealer/investor contacts and broker-dealer/investor research
provisions. 81

A.

Unsolicited or Nondirect Contacts

Under Rule 15a-6(a) (1), a foreign broker-dealer is not required
to register to the extent that it "effects transactions in securities
with or for persons that have not been solicited by the foreign broker or dealer. "82 Therefore, a foreign broker-dealer could effect unsolicited trades for U.S. investors without the use of a U.S. registered broker-dealer intermediary. Although the Rule itself does not
specifically define "solicitation," the Commission indicated that the
term would be best addressed on a case-by-case basis consistent with
Rule 15a-6 proposing and adopting releases. 83

B.

Providing Research to Major

u.s.

Institutional Investors

In general, the Commission considers any deliberate transmission of information, opinions, or recommendations to U.S. investors
as a solicitation, whether directed at individuals or groups. However,
Rule 15a-6(a) (2) provides a conditional exemption from registration
for foreign brokers or dealers that furnish research reports 84 to in79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.

See discussion, infra Part Iv.
6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 58, at 3021.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15a (1999). These exemptions include: "(1) unsolicited or
nondirect contacts between an unregistered foreign broker-dealer and United
States investors; (2) the provision of research by an unregistered foreign broker-dealer to major United States institutional investors; (3) direct contacts between an unregistered foreign broker-dealer and United States investors if the
resulting transactions are effected through a registered broker-dealer; and (4)
direct contacts between an unregistered foreign broker-dealer and five categories of persons with no condition that a registered broker-dealer act as an intermediary." [d.
17 C.ER. § 240.15a-6(a) (1) (1999).
See id.
Paragraph (a) (2) of the Rule does not distinguish between research reports
provided in written or electronic form. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (2) (1999).
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vestors in the United States, and effect transactions with those investors in the securities discussed in the research reports. 85 This exemption is available to foreign broker-dealers, provided that they:
[Furnished] research reports are provided only to major
U.S. institutional investors [ only] ;86 the research reports do
not recommend the use of the foreign broker or dealer to
effect trades in any security; the foreign broker or dealer
does not initiate contact with those major U.S. institutional
investors to follow up on the research reports, and does not
otherwise induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale
of any security by those major U.S. institutional investors; if
the foreign broker or dealer has a relationship with a registered broker or dealer that satisfies the requirements of
Rule 15(a) (3), any transactions with the foreign broker or
dealer in securities discussed in the research reports are effected only through that registered broker or dealer, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (a)(3); and the foreign
broker or dealer does not provide research reports to U.S.
8S.
86.

See id.
A "major U.S. institutional investor" is a "U.S. institutional investor" or registered investment adviser that has total assets or assets under management of
more than $100 million dollars. The term "U.S. institutional investor" is defined in Rule lSa-6(b)(7) to mean: "(1) an investment company registered
with the Commission under section 8 ·of the Investment Company Act of 1940
[i.e. mutual funds]; or (2) a bank, savings and loan association, insurance
company, business development company, small business investment company, or employee benefit plan defined in Rule SOl of Regulation D under
the Securities Act of 1933; a private business development company defined
in Rule SOl (a) (2); an organization described in section S01(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, as defined in Rule SOl(a)(3); or a trust defined in Rule
SOl(a)(7)." 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Sa-6(b)(7)(citations omitted). In 1997, the Commission confirmed its no action advice rega~ding the expansion of the definition of "major U.S. institutional investor." The Commission defined "major
U.S. institutional investor" to include, under all applicable provisions of Rule
lSa-6 and interpretations thereunder, any entity, including any investment adviser (whether or not registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940),
that owns or controls (or, in the case of an investment adviser, has under
management) in excess of $100 million in aggregate financial assets. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1Sa-6(b) (4).
As to the registered investment adviser definition, to determine the total assets of an investment company under the Rule, a registered investment company may include the assets of any family of investment companies of which it
is a part, and the term "family of investment companies" is defined in paragraph (b) (1) of the Rule. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,026.
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persons pursuant to an express or implied understanding
that those U.S. persons will direct commission income to
the foreign broker or dealer.87
This exemption is based upon the Commission's recogmtIOn
that broker-dealers often provide securities research to investors
without charging a fee, with the expectation that the investor will
trade through the broker-dealer. Although such practices could be
deemed solicitation, the Rule provides for the limited exceptions
outlined above. So long as the foreign broker-dealer does not recommend itself for use in effecting trades in any security, and if the
foreign broker-dealer does not initiate follow-up contact with the
major U.S. institutional investors receiving the research, or otherwise does not induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of
any security, the foreign broker-dealer's activities would fall within
the scope of 15a-6(a) (2) and thus be permissible. 88 The Commission
has indicated that "direct distribution would be consistent with the
free flow of information across national boundaries without raising
substantial investor protection concerns. "89
The Commission emphasized, however, that 15a-6(a) (2) is not
available for "soft dollar" arrangements between foreign brokerdealers and U.S. persons. 90 The exemption for research in paragraph (a) (2) would be inapplicable because if a foreign brokerdealer provided research to U.S. investors pursuant to an understanding that the foreign broker-dealer would receive a commission,
they would be considered to have induced purchases. 91
Although this exemption is limited to major U.S. institutional
investors, the Rule's research exemption is broader than either the
proposed interpretive statement or the expanded rule, in that a reg87.
88.
89.
90.

91.

17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (2); 6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 58, at 3016; see also
Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,021..
See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,022.
Id. at 30,023; Inspection Report on the Soft Dollar Practices of Broker-Dealers, Investment Advisors and Mutual Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N. OFFICE OF
CoMPUANCE. INSPEGnONS AND EXAMINERS. Sept. 22, 1998, at 6.
See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,023. "If a foreign broker-dealer
provided research to a U.S. investor pursuant to an express or implied understanding that the investor would direct a given amount of commission income
to the foreign broker-dealer, the Commission would consider the foreign broker-dealer to have induced purchases and sales of securities, irrespective of
whether the trades received from the investor related to the particular research that had been provided." Id.
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istered broker-dealer would not be required to take responsibility
for the content of the report received by the foreign broker-dealer.92
If, however, a foreign broker-dealer, for its own reasons, chose to
distribute its research in the United States through a registered braker-dealer, affiliated or not, NASD Conduct Rule 2210 would require certain disclosures as a component of the research reports.
NASD Conduct Rule 2210 requires that all "[a]dvertisements and
sales literature shall contain the name of the [NASD] member, ...
[and of] the person or firm preparing the material, if other than
the member .... "93 Furthermore, "[s]tatistical tables, charts, graphs
or other illustrations used by members . . . should disclose the
source of the information if not prepared by the member. "94
By its terms, Rule 15a-6(a)(2) is only available when research is
provided to major U.S. institutional investors and the foreign braker-dealer does not engage in any follow-up or solicitation of such
investors. The Commission, therefore, adopted the interpretative
position outside Rule 15a-6. Under this position, it would not require a foreign broker-dealer to register when its research reports
were distributed to U.S. persons, other than major U.S. institutional
investors, by a registered broker-dealer. However, the research report at issue stated that the foreign broker-dealer bore responsibility
for its contents and that U.S. persons who wished to engage in
92.
93.
94.

See id.
NASD REGUlATION INC., NASD Conduct Rule 221O(d) (2)(A) (1999).
Id. at Rule 2210(d) (2) (K). Under Rule 221O(a) (2), "sales literature" specifically includes "research reports, market letters, performance reports or summaries .... " Id. at Rule 221O(a) (2). NASD Conduct Rule 2210 establishes the
standards applicable to all communications made by a member firm to the
public through advertisements and sales literature. Sub-paragraph (d)(l) sets
forth the general standards of disclosure for advertising and sales literature.
Under the-Rule, a member firm's advertising and sales literature must be approved by a registered principal of 'the member prior to release or filing with
the NASD. See id. at Rule 2210 (b) (1).' It is the responsibility of the registered
principal to ensure that the advertising or sales piece complies with the standards set forth in the Rule. See id. Under sub-paragraph (c), a member firm is
required to file certain types of advertising and sales literature with the NASD
within 10 days of first use or publication by the member firm. See id. at
2210(c) (1). The member firm must provide the actual or anticipated date of
first use with the filing. See id. The filing requirements, however, are applicable only to advertisements and sales literature concerning registered investment companies. See id. Advertisements and sales literature used to market
foreign equities would not require filing with the NASD. Such advertisements
and sales literature, however, must still comply with the general and specific
standards set forth in the Rule. See id.
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transactions of securities mentioned in the report could only do so
.
with the registered broker-dealer. 95

C.

Solicited Sales in the United States

Subject to certain conditions, Rule 15a-6(a) (3) permits foreign
brokers or dealers, without registering, to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any security by "U.S. institutional investors"96 or "major U.S. institutional investors, "97 provided the resulting securities transactions are effected through an intermediary
registered broker-dealer.98 Compliance with paragraph (a) (3) is
predicated on the condition that solicitations are to be directed
only to a U.S. institutional investor or to a major U.S. institutional
investor. 99 The Commission reasoned that:
[M] any foreign broker-dealers have established registered
broker-dealer affiliates in the United States that are fully
95.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,023. The registered:
[B]roker-dealer prominently stated on the research report that it had
accepted responsibility for its content if the research report prominently stated that any United States persons receiving the research
and wishing to effect any transactions in any security discussed in the
report should do so with the registered broker-dealer, not the foreign broker-dealer and if the transactions with United States recipients of the report . . . were effected only with or through the registered broker-dealer and not the foreign broker-dealer.
[d. Notably,
[T]he Commission [indicated that it] would not require registration
by a foreign broker-dealer whose research reports were included in a
broadly-distributed electronic database to which U.S. persons who
were not major U.S. institutional investors had access, provided that
(i) a registered broker-dealer accepted responsibility for the research
and for its inclusion in the database, (ii) the registered broker-dealer
prominently stated on the research report, as displayed in the
database, that it had accepted responsibility for its content, and (iii)
the research report prominently indicated that any U.S: persons accessing the report and wishing to effect any transaction in the securities discussed in the report should do so with the registered brokerdealer, not the foreign broker-deaIer. This position does not limit the
research exemption in paragraph (a) (2) for research distributed directly to major U.S. institutional investors, whether in written or electronic form.
[d. n.114.
17 c.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (1998).
Id.
See id. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (i) (A).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3).
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qualified to deal with U.S. investors and trade in U.S. securities. Nonetheless, these foreign broker-dealers may prefer
to deal with institutional investors in the United States from
their overseas trading desks, where their dealer operations
are based. In addition, because overseas trading desks often
are principal sources of current information on foreign
market conditions and foreign securities, many U.S. institutions want direct contact with overseas traders. Foreign broker-dealers themselves often are not willing to register as
broker-dealers directly with the Commission, however, because registration would require the entire firm to comply
with U.S. broker-dealer requirements. loo
A predicate to compliance with paragraph (a) (3) is that solicitations may be directed only to "a U.S. institutional investor or a
major U.S. institutional investor. "101 A foreign broker-dealer may solicit investors so long as the resulting transactions are effected
through the registered broker-dealer in accordance with paragraph
(a) (3) (iii).lOZ In addition, the foreign broker-dealer must generally
submit to information requests by the Commission. lo3 The foreign
broker's representative must not be subject to the "bad boy" provisions of sections 3(a)(39)104 and 15(b)(4),I05 and must conduct all
securities activities from outside the United States, with an important exception: foreign representatives may visit U.S. institutional investors and major U.S. institutional investors if the foreign representative is accompanied by a representative of the registered brokerdealer.lo6 In addition to chaperoning the foreign broker, the registered broker must take responsibility for the foreign broker's U.S.
100. Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,024. The no-action request granted
to Chase Capital Markets US allowed foreign trading operations to receive
calls from U.S. institutional investors without the foreign broker-dealers registering with the Commission. Under the terms of that letter, foreign brokerdealers could be put in touch with U.S. institutional investors by a registered
broker-dealer affiliate, with a U.S.-qualified representative participating in telephone conversations, effecting any resulting transactions, and taking full responsibility for the trades. Id. (citing letter from Amy Natterson Kroll, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Frank C.
Puleo, Esq., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (dated July 28, 1987».
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3) (1998).
102. See id. § 240.15a-6(a)(3) (i)(A).
103. See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (3) (i)(B).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (39) (1999).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (1999).
106. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(ii)(A)(1) (1998).
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communications, and must effect transactions in any secuntIes discussed during the chaperoned visits. 107 Section (a) (3)(iii) sets forth
the responsibilities of the registered broker-dealer in connection
with the activities covered by Rule 15a-6. 108
In a fine example of circular regulation, section (a) (3) (i) (A)
requires that the foreign broker must effect transactions through
the registered broker "in the manner described by paragraph
(a) (3) (iii)."I09 Section (a) (3) (iii) (A) (1) accomplishes this by simply
repeating that the registered entity is only responsible for effecting
transactions, rather than negotiating the terms. I1O The concept that
transactions are "effected through" the registered broker is clearly
important; but ascertaining what is meant by that phrase is elusive.
The requirement that transactions be "effected through" registered
entities has not been elaborated upon in the proposing or adopting
releases. NASD Regulation Inc. addressed the issue in a 1998 Notice
to Members.11l In addition, the Commission has also issued several
no-action positions. ll2
In the absence of anything more definitive, it seems plausible
that "effecting through" is simply intended to encompass the responsibilities covered in paragraphs (a) (3) (iii) (A) (2)-(6). Among
those responsibilities are: issuing confirmations and statements; arranging the extension of credit on margin transactions; maintaining
books and records as required under Exchange Act Rules 17a-3 and
17a-4; complying with Rule 15c3-1 net capital requirements; and
complying with· 15c3-3 rules as to physical possession and control,
and required reserve accounts.ll3
Paragraphs (a) (3) (iii) (B) through (E) cover miscellaneous issues such as the need for the registered broker to obtain consent to
service of process and Form U-4 type information from the foreign
representatives,114 as well as a parallel to the paragraph (a) (3) (ii)
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(ii)(A) (1999). These sections specifically provide an exception to the general rule that people associated with foreign brokers must conduct all securities activities outside of the United States. See id.
An individual associated with a foreign broker is allowed to conduct visits to
U.S. institutional investors if this individual is accompanied by a person associated with a registered broker. See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (3) (ii) (A)(I).
108. See id. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (iii) (A) (1)-(6).
109. Id. § 240. 15a-6.
110. See id. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(iii) (A) (1).
111. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (iii)(A) (1999).
114. See id. § 240. 15a-6 (a)(3) (iii) (B)-(E).
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chaperoning requirement.

D.

Transactions with U.S. Brokers and Others

Paragraph (a) (4) of Rule 15a-6 provides an exemption from registration to foreign broker-dealers that solicit or transact business
only with, among others, registered broker dealers or banks.1l5 However, the exclusion for transactions with banks may no longer be
valid after the effectiveness, in May 2001, of the "push-out" provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.116 The purpose of the
Act is to "enhance competition in the financial services industry."117
It also provides a "framework for the affiliation of banks, securities
firms, insurance companies, and other financial serVice
providers." 118
Under Rule 15a-6, a foreign broker-dealer may transact business
with certain other persons or entities.Il9 This list of other persons or
entities includes certain international agencies,120 foreign persons
temporarily in the United States with whom the foreign broker had
an existing relationship,121 and U.S. persons either permanently located or resident outside the United States, so long as the foreign
broker does not target identifiable groups of U.S. citizens who are
resident abroad. 122

115.
116.
117.
118.

119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (4)(i).
See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1228 (1999).
Id.
Id. Among other things, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act eliminates the historic
exclusion of banks from the definitions of "broker" and "dealer" in sections
3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act. See id. § 201.20. Other than certain
limited exceptions for traditional banking activities, a bank engaging in brokerage activities must register as a broker-dealer. See generaUy § 201.20: Therefore, the Rule 15a-6(a) (4) exclusion for transactions with banks may be a
dead letter.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (4) (1999).
See id. § 240.15a-6(a)( 4) (ii). Examples include the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. See id.
See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (4).
See id.
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COMMENTS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSION

A. Intermediation Maintained
Despite twenty-four comments to the contrary, the Commission
decided to continue requiring the intermediation of a registered
broker-dealer to address concerns regarding financial responsibility
and the effective enforcement of U.S. securities laws.123 The registered broker-dealer, however, is not required to implement procedures to obtain positive assurance that the foreign broker-dealer was
operating in accordance with U.S. requirements. 124 Moreover, the
intermediary does not need to be affiliated with a foreign brokerdealer through ownership or contro1. 125 Since a nonresident registered broker-dealer was eligible to serve as intermediary under the
Rule, the Commission reasoned that costs incurred by a foreign
broker-dealer in complying with the Rule 15a-6(a) (3) direct contact
exemption could be reduced. 126
The Commission indicated, however, that the registered brokerdealer, in effecting trades arranged by the foreign broker-dealer,
has a responsibility to review these trades for indications of possible
violations of the federal securities laws. 127 The registered brokerdealer's intermediation in these trades is intended to help protect
U.S. investors and securities markets. The Commission concluded
that a registered broker-dealer would have an obligation, as it has
for all customer accounts, to review any Rule 15a-6 account for indications of potential problems. 128
In addition to the above responsibility, the Commission stated:
[I]f the registered broker-dealer ignores indications of irregularity that should alert the registere~ broker-dealer to
the likelihood that the foreign broker-dealer is taking advantage of U.S. customers or otherwise violating U.S. securities laws, and the registered broker-dealer nevertheless continues to effect questionable transactions on behalf of the
foreign broker-dealer or its customers, the registered bro123.
124.
125.
126.

See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,024-25.
See id. at 30,025.
See id.
See id. An unregistered U.S. bank is not eligible to serve the intermediary
function, since a bank "would not be subject to the Commission's extensive
statutory authority to regulate, examine, and discipline registered brokerdealers." Id. at 30,026.
127. See id. at 30,025.
128. See id.
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ker-dealer's role in the trades may give rise to possible violations of the federal securities laws. 129
This discussion of the registered broker's responsibilities vis-a-vis the
foreign broker and its representatives begs the question of what actions must occur for a transaction to be "effected through" the registered broker.

B.

''Effected Through" Requirement

The requirement that transactions must be "effected through"
the U.S. intermediary broker-dealer is not elaborated upon in the
proposing or adopting releases. Therefore, what actions are sufficient to constitute "effecting through" have been less than clear.
This issue was addressed in a 1998 Notice to Members
("NTM") from NASD Regulation Inc. ("NASDR") .130 Rule
2860(6) (3) imposes a limit on the number of equity options contracts in a class of stock options on the same side of the market
(long calls plus short puts, or long puts plus short calls)131 that can
be written by a member or an associated person. 132 NTM 98-92
. asked whether the Rule 2860 (6) (3) limits apply to options transactions intermediated by U.S. broker-dealers pursuant to Rule 15a6(a) (3).133
NASDR indicated some members take the position that since
options transactions are "intermediated" but are not carried on the
U.S. member firm's books, for capital purposes, the transactions are
not covered by Rule 2860(b)(3).134 NASDR disagreed. In finding
that the Rule applied, NASDR stated that even though the option
position was maintained by the foreign affiliate, the transaction was
"effected" by the U.S. member within the meaning of Rule 15a6(a) (3).135 In stating its rationale, NASDR argued that its position
was consistent with the purpose of Rule 2860(b)(3), and noted that
since the U.S. member must record the affiliate's transactions, "the
129. Id. at 30,026 (citing Merrill Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 19,070, 26 SEC
Docket 254 (dated Sept. 21, 1982».
130. See NASD REGULATION INC., 1998 Notice to Members 98-92 (Nov. 1998).
131. A "put" is an option to sell a specified amount of a commodity at a fixed
price at or within a given time. A "call" is an option to buy a certain amount
of a commodity at a fixed price at or within a given time. See MERRlAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 162, 195 (10th ed. 1995).
132. See NASD Conduct Rule 2860 (1999).
133. See NASD Conduct Rule 221O(d)(2) (A).
134. See id.
135. See id.
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member has the practical ability to enforce compliance."136
The position taken by the NASDR seems to imply that it has
adopted an expansive view of what actions of the U.S. intermediary
are sufficient for a transaction to be deemed to have been "effected
through" that firm. This at least raises the question of whether the
NASDR would be similarly expansive in a situation where it was not
trying to reach a desired regulatory outcome.
However, further support for a liberal reading of the "effected
through" requirement can be found in several no-action positions
of the Commission. For example, a core element of "effecting
through" is the maintenance by the U.S. intermediary broker-dealer
of the books and records relating to the covered transactions. The
Commissron has gone so far as to determine that an arrangement
would be permissible where the information for such books and
records is generated by the foreign broker-dealer and then transmitted electronically to an automated matching system that is under
the joint control of the foreign broker-dealer and the registered
U.S. intermediary.137
In this letter, the staff indicated that no enforcement action
would be taken where the foreign broker made all records of the
clearing and settlement of transactions that resulted from buy/sell
matches made by the automated system and were executed by the
foreign broker. 138 The records would be shared electronically with
the U.S. intermediary broker, and the parties requesting the noaction position represented that the U.S. broker would remain responsible for the accuracy of the records published, as well as the
prompt delivery of those records to the Commission or other examining authorityY9
The basis for the staff's position in Investment Technology Group,
Inc. appears to have been that the imposition of dual record keep136. Id.
137. See Investment Technology Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 1011, *4 (Oct. 6, 1993). The Commission allowed an arrangement
whereby Jefferies International Limited, an unregistered foreign brokerdealer, executed trades then transmitted the records to Global Portfolio System for Institutional Trading. See id. at *4-5. Global, an automated system that
matches purchasers to sellers of non-U.S. securities, was operated by Investment Technology Group, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jefferies Group, Inc.
that is a registered broker-dealer. See id. at *1-2. Both Investment Technology
Group and Jefferies International Limited controlled Global's computer system. See id. at *4.
138. See id. at *4-5.
139. See id.
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ing requirements - i.e., on both the domestic and the foreign brokerage entities - is not only inefficient, but also increases the risk of
operational error. l40 It is also implicit in the staff's conclusion that
advances in electronic communications make it irrelevant where
certain functions, such as record keeping, take place, so long as the
regulatory intent - availability of records - is served. 141
This reasoning would explain a similar position taken in 1996.
In a letter to Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., the staff reached a number of conclusions that are important to understanding the current
state of Rule 15a-6. 142 In its application, Morgan Stanley represented
that as a U.S. broker-dealer, it is prohibited from holding funds and
securities in India on behalf of U.S. customers. 143 To address this restriction, M;organ Stanley proposed to have transactions in Indian
securities for U.S. customers executed by Morgan Stanley's Indian
affiliate, Morgan Stanley India ("MSI") and settled through the customer's custodian. l44 Although trade orders were to be placed with
Morgan Stanley representatives, the order would not be entered
into or processed on Morgan Stanley's books and records. Trades
would be entered only onto the MSI system, by MSI employees. 145
Morgan Stanley argued that dual trade entry and reconciliation
of dual sets of books would entail substantial additional costs. The
application acknowledges that the recordkeeping and retention requirements under Exchange Act Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4146 would not
be met, and the trades executed through the foreign affiliate would
not be taken into account for purposes of Morgan Stanley's compliance with Exchange Act Rules 17a-5 147 and 17a-13. 148 Moreover, the
140. The efficiency and accuracy factors also contributed to the staff decision in International operations Association Securities Industry Association. See infra notes 16269 and accompanying text.
141. See Investment Technology Group, Inc., supra note 137.
142. -See Morgan Stanley India Securities Pvt. Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 975 (Dec. 20, 1996).
143. See id. at *2.
144. See id.
145. See id. at *3-4.
146. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3, -4 (1999) (requiring brokers registered pursuant to
the Exchange Act to record all daily transactions and the individual accounts
which may be effected, and further requires these records to be preserved for
at least three years).
147. See id. § 240.17a-5 (requiring brokers registered pursuant to the Exchange Act
to periodically file customer account transactions with the Commission's office).
148. See id. § 240.17a-13 (requiring brokers registered pursuant to the Exchange
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confirmation delivered to V.S. customers on each transaction would
be "combined in whole or in part with the confirmation provided
by MSISL, but [it] will describe as appropriate the role of [Morgan
Stanley] as agent .... "149
Nonetheless, the staff concluded that it would not recommend
enforcement action under the circumstances. 150 A key to this decision was that through the linked computer systems of Morgan Stanley and MSI, "the trade records entered onto MSISL records will become available to [Morgan Stanley], as soon as they are entered, on the
same basis as if the trades had been entered directly onto [Morgan
Stanley'S] records. "151
Certainly, there were other factors that the staff considered in
arriving at its conclusion: (1) that the trades would be effected on a
"delivery versus payment" basis; (2) that Morgan Stanley- would take
charges for failed trades in accordance with Rule 15c3-1; (3) that it
would comply with reserve formula requirements, even though Morgan Stanley would not receive, deliver or hold the subject funds or
securities; and (4) that it would reconcile trade tickets written by its
representatives against trades entered on MSI's books. 152 But the
condition precedent for this arrangement, and seemingly the sine
qua non for the staff's acceptance, was the existence of a network
that permitted real time transmission and sharing of trade data
across international boundaries and time zones. 153
In sum, the "effected through" requirement has become less
meaningful as electronic communications have improved. While the
requirement itself may have some validity, the nominal indicia are
in many respects outmoded. There should be flexibility in what actions will satisfy this requirement.
C.

Rule 15c3-3 Custody and Reserve Requirements

Among the requirements of paragraph (a) (3) (iii) of Rule 15a-6
is that the registered V.S. broker-dealer comply with Rule 15c3-3. 154
Rule 15c3-3, under the Exchange Act, requires that a broker-dealer
maintain physical possession or control of all fully-paid and excess

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Act to file quarterly reports accounting for all
their control).
Morgan Stanley, supra note 142, at *17.
See id. at *4.
ld. at *4 (emphasis added).
See id. at *3-6.
See id. at *3-8.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (iii) (A)(6) (1999).

securiti~s

transacted under
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margin securities carried for the customer's account.155 Rule 15c3-3
further requires the broker-dealer to make deposits to a reserve account based upon the amount of customer funds obtained by the
firm, less the amount of funds extended to, or on behalf of, the
customer. 156
A no-action letter issued subsequent to the Rule 15a-6 Adopting
Release demonstrates how technological advances have rendered
moot certain assumptions made under the Rule, particularly with
respect to the control and reserve requirements. In a letter issued
to RMK International Securities, Inc., the staff reviewed an application by a U.S. broker to act as an agent for U.S. customers who
wished to purchase or sell German securities. 157
RMK, the U.S. broker, represented that it would maintain a
cash account and a securities account at ADCA Bank in Frankfurt. 15s
When RMK received a purchase order, RMK would forward the order to a foreign broker for execution. 159 The foreign firm would
purchase securities for its own account as principal, and sell
through RMK as an agent for the U.S. customer. l60 The customer
would pay for the securities by transferring deutsche marks to the
ADCA Bank account, or by instructing its custodian to transfer
funds to the account in exchange for delivery of the securities. 161
Upon receipt of the customer's funds and occurrence of the settlement date,162 the acquired securities would be credited to the ADCA
account, and transferred by means of the Kassenverein System, an
automated book-entry clearing system, to the customer's custodian.
For a sale, the U.S. customer's custodian would transfer German se155. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15c3-3 (b) (1), (b)(4)(i)(D)(1999).
156. See id. § 240.15c3-3(e).
157. See RMK International Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178760, *4
(Jan. 29, 1991).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. The staff had previously examined the applicability of Rule 15c3-3 in light of
diverse settlement periods and procedures in international securities markets.
See International Operations Association Securities Industry Association, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1066, *3-9 (Sept. 4, 1990). The
staff found, among other things, that broker-dealers could treat the settlement
date of foreign issued and settled securities according to the customary settlement cycle in a particular country. See id. at *7. In addition, in certain countries with highly developed markets, failed trades could be determined and
aged based upon that customary date. See id. at *8.
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cuntles sold through the Kassenverein System to the ADCA account. 163 Upon receipt of the securities by ADCA Bank, the sales
proceeds would be credited to the ADCA account and tp.e securities
transferred to the purchaser.
In assessing whether to enforce Rule 15c3-3, the staff noted the
applicant's representations that settlement of transactions in the
ADCA account occurred simultaneously, so that customer funds or
securities would not be held in the account. Other than transfers
into the account immediately prior to settlement, customer funds or
securities would be held in the account only because of an error, or
due to a failure to settle. l64 RMK represented that customer securities or funds held due to errors or failure to settle would be returned to the customer immediately. 165
The staff concluded that no enforcement action would be
taken if no deposits to the 15c3-3 Special Reserve Account were
made, and if physical possession or control were not obtained. 166
The staff's finding once again hinged on the existence of electronic
communications that would allow for simultaneous settlement of
transactions through the foreign bank account, and the ability of
the U.S. broker to immediately return funds or securities held due to
errors or fails, coupled with the U.S. broker's representation that it
could not independently cause funds or securities to be moved out
of its customers' custodial accounts. 167
While not a focus of the staff's response, certain of the incoming correspondence from RMK had noted that other clearing systems besides Kassenverein, namely Euroclear and CEDEL (via a
"bridge" from Euroclear) might be used. 168 Also, in what perhaps
foreshadowed a later 15a-6 interpretation by the staff, the applicant
affirmed that all of its U.S. clients would be Qualified Institutional
Buyers ("QIBs") as defined in Rule 144A.169

D.

Expansion of Permissible Contacts

A no-action letter issued shortly after the Morgan Stanley India
letter170 re-affinned several of the positions taken in that letter, and
163. See RMK International Securities, supra note 157, at *2.
164. See id. at *5.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at *1.
See id.
See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
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also established some important new guidelines for compliance with
Rule 15a-6 requirements. The letter was issued to the law firm of
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (Cleary Gottlieb),171 which had
applied on behalf of a number of financial center investment
banks.172 The application sought to: (1) expand the range of U.S.
investors that may enter into transactions with U.S.-affiliated foreign broker-dealers; (2) permit the direct transfer of funds and securities from U.S. investors to such foreign broker-dealers; (3) expand the permitted oral and in-person contacts by such foreign
broker-dealers; and (4) clarify that providing quotation systems that
supply price and trading information from foreign broker-dealers
would not constitute an impermissible contact under the rule.173 In
presenting its case, Cleary Gottlieb noted that institutional investors
now consider a "global approach" to be essential, and that the
force that both drives and facilitates this approach is the "widespread availability of computer-based and related communicated
technologies. "174
With regard to the range of U.S. investors covered by the Rule,
the applicant noted that the definitions of "U.S. institutional investor" and "major U.S. institutional investor"175 omitted some significant classes of investors, such as U.S. business corporations and
partnerships.176 Also omitted were investment funds advised by investment managers that are exempt from registration under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.177 The staff acceded to the applicant's
request that U.S. affiliated foreign broker dealers be permitted to
engage in transactions with any entity, including an investment adviser whether or not he is registered, that owns, controls or (as to
advisers) manages $100 million or more in financial assets. 178 In a
17l. See Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 525 (Apr. 9, 1997).
172. See id. at *l. The firms represented were: Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.; Credit
Suisse First Boston Corporation; CSFP Capital, Inc.; Goldman Sachs & Co.;
Lehman Brothers, Inc.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated;
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.; Salomon Brothers, Inc.; and Smith Barney, Inc.
See id. at n.l.
173. See id. at *20-36.
174. Id. at *17.
175. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. 15a-6 (b) (4), (7) (1989).
176. See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *3.
177. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-3(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
178. See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *4, 14. In granting this relief, the staff
closed, to a significant degree, the gap that had existed between the definitions of "major U.S. institutional investor" in Rule 15a-6 and "qualified institu-
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follow-up letter, the staff clarified that this interpretation applied to
the provisions of paragraph (a) (2) as well as paragraph (a) (3) and
to all applicable provisions of Rule 15a-6 and interpretations
thereunder. 179
While technology-driven operations of U.S. investors underpinned the need to expand the definition of "major U.S. institutional investors," the request for relief from the customer protection provisions, requiring possession and control by the registered
broker-dealer, is a more direct outcome of technological advances.
In its application, Cleary Gottlieb notes that many U.S. institutions
engage foreign custodians to hold, receive and deliver their foreign
securities and local currencies. 180 The settlement of a trade between
a U.S. customer and its foreign counterpart is effected most efficiently when the foreign broker-dealer is the sole intermediary between the parties. As explained by Cleary Gottlieb, the interposition
of a U.S. broker-dealer would serve not only to cause a duplication
of custodial, accounting and other settlement functions, but also
would increase the risk of operational errors and settlement
failures. 181
The Commission accepted this reasoning, but subject to the
conditions that the foreign broker-dealer must make clearance and
settlement information available to the registered broker-dealer,
that the foreign broker-dealer may not be in default on any material financial market transaction, and also that the U.S. intermediary
broker-dealer must fulfill its other obligations under Rule 15a-6. 182
The next element of the application sought to broaden the foreign broker-dealer's ability to contact U.S. investors personally and
through the provision of electronic data. Under Rule 15a-6, personal contacts by the foreign broker-dealer are subject to the so-

179.
180.
181.
182.

tional buyer" (QIB) in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933. See 17
C.F.R. § 230. 144A. Subsection (a) (1) (H) of Rule 144A had already included
corporations, partnerships, and business trusts as "QIBs." See id. §
230.144A(a) (i) (I)(H). See also id. § 230. 144A(a) (i)-(iv) (giving other examples
of QIBs). This appears to have provided a further rationale for the staff's position.
See Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 573 (Apr. 28, 1997).
See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *25.
See id. at *24-25.
See id. at *14-15. Neither the Cleary Gottlieb application nor the staff's response focuses on the paragraph (a) (3) responsibility of the registered broker
for delivery of confirmations and statements, as well as other books and
records requirements.
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called "chaperoning" requirements. 183 These requirements include
limitations on both phone contacts and in-person visits by the foreign broker-dealers, unless a representative of the registered brokerdealer is present. 184
In accepting the arguments set forth by Cleary Gottlieb, the
staff agreed to loosen the strictures of Rule 15a-6 so that foreign
representatives, without the intermediation of the U.S. brokerdealer, could: (1) engage in oral communications from abroad with
U.S. institutional investors where communications take place outside
the trading hours of the New York Stock Exchange,185 so long as the
unregistered foreign broker-dealer accepts orders only for foreign
securities; and (2) have in-person contacts in the United States with
major U.S. institutional investors, so long as the number of days on
which in-person contacts occur does not exceed 30 per year and the
foreign representatives do not accept orders while in the United
States. 186
The other relief relating to contacts with U.S. investors was the
request to relax the Commission's stance on provision of quotation
systems. In the Adopting Release, the Commission stated that it
would permit the distribution of third party quotation systems to
U.S. investors where the quotations transmitted over such systems
were delivered "primarily in foreign countries. "187 In addition, proprietary quotation systems - where the U.S. investors could place a
trade through the foreign broker/market maker providing the quotations - were viewed by the Commission as an impermissible inducement to trade with that foreign broker-dealer.l88
The applicant noted that since quotation systems had become
more global through a variety of technological improvements since
adoption of Rule 15a-6, it was no longer practicable to distinguish a
system by whether its quotation data was delivered "primarily in foreign countries. "189 As to proprietary systems, while acknowledging
183. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(iii) (1999); see also supra notes 1O(}.Q8 and accompanying text.
184. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a) (3)(ii) (A) (l),(iii) (B) (1999).
185. See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *9-10. Also, while the application deals
with specifics of oral and in-person communications, it is unclear howe-mail
would be treated. See id.
186. See id. at *9-10, 14.
187. Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,017,
54 Fed. Reg. 30,013, 30,018 (July 18, 1989).
188. See id. at 30,019.
189. Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, *32.
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that trades placed by the U.S. investor might be viewed as solicited
and therefore outside the Rule 15a-6(a)(1) exemption for unsolicited trades, the applicant observed that quotations were already permitted to be delivered orally.1OO Cleary Gottlieb summed up its argument by stating that "the availability of improved technologies for
providing investors with quotations should not be restricted merely
because it is impossible to 'chaperone' a data transmission."191
As with the other relief requested, the staff accepted these positions. Notably, the staff expressly made the no-action relief applicable not only to Cleary Gottlieb and its clients, but also to all similarly situated U.S. registered broker-dealers and foreign affiliate
broker-dealers. 192
Taken in isolation, the Cleary Gottlieb letters might appear to
be a watershed event in the interpretation of Rule 15a-6. However,
the positions taken by the staff in those letters are consistent with
earlier decisions. Subsequent decisions have continued to vitiate the
restrictiveness of the Rule as improvements in communications technology link the world's financial markets ever more closely together.
VI. CONCLUSION
The globalization of the securities industry has continued to accelerate since the adoption of Rule 15a-6. Competition between U.S.
firms and foreign securities firms has become intense as each seeks
to become a one-stop provider of a comprehensive and costeffective range of financial products and related services for their
customers. These firms are anxious to engage in cross-border transactions in an effort to either maintain or create equal access to the
marketplace. Institutional investors recognize that their investment
strategies must reflect the significance of proper diversification and
a global approach to investing. Even some" retail investors have
demonstrated considerable interest in purchasing foreign securities
as they go public. They too recognize that companies around the
globe are capable of impacting their domestic economy.
Much of the marketplace competition has been fueled by technological and communications advances, as well as industry deregulation. The Internet and ECNs are already bridging the gap between buyers and sellers of securities, effectively diminishing the
need for an intermediary broker. For institutions, clearing systems,
190. See ill. at *34.
191. [d.
192. See ill. at *14.

204

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

such as DTC, Kassenverein, Crest and Euroclear (to name a few),
make real-time global communication and transactions a reality.193
The advances have spurred market activity to reach all-time highs.
All of which brings us to our original question: if U.S. securities
laws and regulations are designed to establish and promote markets
that are fair and efficient, then-in a world where national boundaries have become secondary to market imperatives-has Rule 15a-6
outlived its usefulness? Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, stated "if barriers to competition did not exist, then neither would the need, in many respects,
for regulatory involvement. "194 This statement may be apropos of
Rule 15a-6.

193. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
194. September 23, 1999 speech delivered at Columbia Law School as reported by
the Wall Street Journal.

